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ABSTRACT
Snap: Robust Tool for Internet-wide Operating System
Fingerprinting. (December 2010)
Ankur Bharatbhushan Nandwani, B.Tech., National Institute of Technology-Surat
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dmitri Loguinov
Different approaches have been developed for TCP/IP fingerprinting, but none
of these approaches is suited for Internet-wide fingerprinting. In this work, we develop
approaches that rigorously tackle the issue of noise and packet loss while carrying out
Internet-wide fingerprinting. We then carry out an Internet-wide scan to determine
the distribution of different operating systems on the Internet. The results of our
scan indicate that there are approximately 8.9 million publicly accessible web-servers
on the Internet running Linux, while there are nearly 9.6 million web-servers with
different embedded operating systems.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With the exponential growth of computer networks, it has become a challenge to
effectively manage and secure these networks. One of the integral components of
managing and securing networks is to be aware of the operating system running on
each machine connected to the network. Operating system fingerprinting as its name
suggest aims to identify the OS of a remote machine, by either sending probes to the
machine or by sniffing traffic originating from remote machines. While the former
comes under the class of approaches known as active fingerprinting, the later belongs
to passive fingerprinting, as no probes are sent to the target machine.
Operating System fingerprinting had its origins in banner grabbing, where one
tried to connect to a remote machine on a particular service like FTP. Telnet and
HTTP, and then use the displayed banner to identify the operating system. Since the
banner can be easily be modified, banner grabbing gave way to techniques which base
their identification on the TCP/IP stack. Identification, with TCP/IP stack is made
possible because various RFC’s like 1122 [1] and 2988 [2] that deal with TCP/IP,
are ambiguous about certain features, while for some other features they provide no
guidelines, thus resulting in developers having different interpretations of the TCP/IP
protocol, leading to implementations unique to an OS.
A. Motivation
In this paper, we develop robust techniques that would allow us to fingerprint all
the publicly accessible machines on the Internet. The main motivation behind this
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2work is that developing techniques to work at such a large scale would allow us to
find the vulnerable population for a malware on the Internet in less than 40 minutes
using a custom scanner. While fingerprinting, we make sure that we use the bare
minimum packets and only use packets that conform to the TCP/IP protocol. Owing
to limiting the number of probes, the techniques we develop can be used by the
network administrators of large corporate networks to scan their networks in real
time, without clogging the network, or resulting in denial of service attack. Also,
since we use protocol conforming packets, the risk of bringing down machines which
are not adequately equipped to handle malformed packets is greatly reduced.
B. Our Contribution
Over the past decade, many tools [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] have been developed to carry out
operating system fingerprinting by analyzing the TCP/IP stack properties. These
tools use different type and number of probes for fingerprinting purposes. While
fingerprinting machines on the Internet one has to inherently deal with noise and
packet loss. Whereas noise can result in unknown values for various fields of TCP/IP
headers and random retransmission timeout value, packet loss which is to the extent of
3.8% [10] on the internet, can drastically change the observed retransmission timeout
values (RTO). Hence, if we don’t consider these factors while carrying out a scan,
then the results we achieve are bound to be inaccurate. Current tools [6, 8] which use
retransmission timeout values fail to address the issues of packet loss on one hand,
while are also ineffective in dealing with noise. Thus the major contribution of this
paper is to develop robust techniques that deal with noise and packet loss, and apply
the developed techniques for Internet-wide OS fingerprinting.
In the first part of the paper we discuss the problem of fingerprinting using
3RTO and the challenges associated with it. Also, we discuss how we augmented the
signature vector and built the signature database. The fingerprinting methodology we
use can be broken down into two steps, the first being data collection, where we send
SYN probes similar to those sent by Windows Server 2008, to the target machines and
log all the responses received from the target. The second step is classification, where
by using Retransmission Timeout values in conjugation with various features derived
from TCP/IP headers of the response packet, and applying a custom classification
algorithm, we classify the target machines into different operating system.
In the next section we propose a custom classification scheme that robustly deals
with both noise and packet loss. We then evaluate our classification scheme against
the default scheme used by Snacktime for classification.
Finally, to get a picture of the distribution of different operating systems on
the internet, we scan the internet for all the machines which have port 80 open,
and at the same time fingerprint by running our classification algorithm on received
response packets. Of the 37.8 million machines, which responded to our SYN probes
with SYN-ACK packets, nearly 9.6 million machines are running different embedded
OS, the major chunk of these embedded OS being VxWorks. VxWorks is a popular
embedded OS mainly used in routers, modems and printers. This is followed by Linux
which account for nearly 8.9 million machines. This is followed by Windows which
collectively account for nearly 5.2 million machines.
C. Ethical Implications
The work presented in this paper can be used for both good and bad purposes. On one
hand it can be used to secure a large network, while on the other hand, it can also be
used by the hackers to surreptitiously scan the Internet for vulnerable machines. To
4counteract this threat caused by the hackers, a simple solution would be to randomize
the first RTO value, since in most cases successive RTO values are computed based
on the initial RTO. Also, simply altering values of various TCP/IP header fields can
drastically reduce the accuracy of fingerprinting. We hope that by publishing this
work, during the future implementation of TCP/IP protocol in different OS, these
techniques could be kept in mind, so that risk of detection could be reduced.
5CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
OS fingerprinting has been studied for a long time now, but most of the work has been
done by independent hackers. Initial approaches used banner grabbing, but since the
banner for most of the services can be easily changed, the focus shifted towards the
use of TCP/IP stack for identification. Of the techniques that use TCP/IP stack,
some send probes to the target machines [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], while others involve sniffing
traffic [7, 9]. At the same time some techniques have even made use of application
level data for OS detection [5, 4]. Since OS fingerprinting poses a network security
threat, work has also been to defend against fingerprinting.
A. Active Fingerprinting
Among the tools used for fingerprinting, Nmap [3] is the most actively developed and
widely used tool. Developed by Fyodor, it has one of the largest user contributed
signature database, and is fairly accurate. But it is of limited utility when scanning
on the internet because it suffers from various issues. Firstly, it uses 16 packets per
machine, which would result in lot of traffic when considering all the machines on the
internet. Secondly, it uses malformed packet, thus allowing signatures to be written
to detect its probes. In fact Snort [11] has signatures to detect nmap probes. Finally,
it requires and open and closed port, for which it does a port scan, thereby again
increasing the number of packets sent to a machine.
Since Nmap is the most popular tool, a lot of work has also been done to improve
the same. Sarraute et al. [12] propose the use of neural networks to identify different
versions of a same operating system. Medeiros et al. [13] also make use of neural
networks, to add the capability of identification of unknown devices to Nmap. In
6 RTO1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RTO2 R-RTO1 
Fig. 1. RTO (*Not sent by all OS).
[14], Greenwald et al. discuss how information theoretic measures could be used to
reduce the number of probes that are sent by Nmap, and at the same time get good
results. Finally, Shu et al. [15], explore the use of Parameterized Extended Finite
State Machines with Nmap for fingerprinting.
Xprobe2++ [5], is a tool which makes use of ICMP probes, SYN probes, and
application layer requests for fingerprinting. It has a modular architecture,which
allows the user to control which probes are sent to the target machine. By default
the latest version uses 13 modules, which includes two application layer requests
modules.
RING [8] and Snacktime [6], both base their detection on Retransmission timeout
values. RING was developed as a proof of concept tool, and it uses Retransmission
timeout values to detect the OS of a machine. The initial version of RING only
made use of SYN-ACK RTO values and presence of RST or RST-ACK packet. Later
version of RING gave an option of considering RTO values of FIN-ACK packets. Now,
in order to get the RTO values for FIN-ACK packets, at least 3 packets need to be
sent per machine, making the approach infeasible for the internet. Snacktime (Fig.
1) which is based on RING uses RTO values of SYN-ACK packets in combination
with the observed Window Size and TTL values to determine the operating system
7of the machine. In Snacktime, the client first sends a SYN packet to the remote
machine and then listens for SYN-ACK packets. If it fails to get a response for 65
seconds(default value) it terminates the connection and proceeds with fingerprinting.
Now, during fingerprinting only signatures which have the same length as that of the
generated fingerprint are considered, and then using different weights for different
features similarity between a signature and fingerprint is computed. The signature
with the highest similarity to the fingerprint is returned as detected OS. Also, OS
corresponding to signatures with second and third highest similarities are returned
as probable matches.
Some work has also been done academically, in the domain of TCP/IP finger-
printing. In [16], Caballero et al. develop an approach similar to fuzz testing, to come
up with new probes that could be used for fingerprinting. But, since non-standard
probes are generated, IDS/IPS signatures could be written to detect the same, hence
fingerprinting could be easily circumvented. Medeiros et al. in [17], present a tech-
nique to fingerprint OS based on only Initial Sequence Number, which is based on
the work done in [18] . The problem with this approach is that it requires thousands
of ISN samples per machine, making the approach infeasible for large scale scanning
and easily prone to detection.
B. Passive Fingerprinting
p0f [9] is a tool primarily built for passive fingerprinting. It supports 4 modes of
fingerprinting, they being the SYN mode, SYN-ACK mode, RST+ mode and the
stray ACK mode. The first and the third mode support passive fingerprinting, while
the second and the fourth mode are for active fingerprinting. The SYN mode has
the largest signature database and seems to be the most developed, while the other
8modes are not well supported. p0f makes use of options, various TCP/IP quirks and
values of TCP/IP fields for OS detection.
C. Defenses
There exist many tools to defend against OS fingerprinting. Berrueta in his paper
[19] provides an overview of tools to defend against Nmap. In [20], a proof of concept
tool using Netfilter [21] kernel module for fingerprinting evasion is presented. Use
and effectiveness of Honeyd against fingerprinting tools has been discussed in [22,
23]. Smart et. al. present a fingerprinting scrubber in [24] as a general solution
to protection against TCP/IP fingerprinting to be implemented at the gateway. As
stated in the paper, fingerprinting scrubber effectively deals with static approaches
but is not well developed for temporal approaches like RING and Snacktime.
9CHAPTER III
OPERATING SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING
In this section we first formulate the problem of OS fingerprinting, follow it by ex-
plaining the issue of noise and packet loss, and conclude by discussing Snacktime.
A. General Problem Formulation
The problem of Operating System fingerprinting is closely related to the problem
of pattern matching, therefore we formally state our problem using the terminology
of pattern matching. Assuming a set of c unique operating system types where
C = {ω1, . . . , ωc}, the signature of the i-th OS is a vector Si = {Si,1, . . . , Si,ni}, where
Si,j is the random variable represented the j-th feature of the OS i. Fig. 2 shows
the randomness in RTO values. These values were measured for machines in our lab
itself, hence they correspond to the randomness in the RTO values itself and not
network delays.
Now assuming that M is a random variable (vector of features) representing a
response from a host on the Internet, the classification goal is to find the most likely
class iopt in C that could have generated M such that
iopt = argmax
i
P (M ∈ ωi|M = m). (3.1)
Using Bayes rule (3.1) can be expressed as
iopt = argmax
i
P (M = m|M ∈ ωi)P (M ∈ ωi)
P (M = m)
. (3.2)
Now, the conditional probability P (M = m|M ∈ ωi) is equivalent to the prob-
ability P (Si = m), and the probability of a measurement M = m is constant for all
10
2 2.5 3 3.5 45.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
RTO1
R
TO
2
(a) Windows Server 2003
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.55.9
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
RTO1
R
TO
2
(b) Linux 2.6.x
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the signatures hence we can reduce (3.2) to
iopt = argmax
i
{P (Si = m)P (M ∈ ωi)} (3.3)
The work done in this paper deals with estimating the probability of the measured
value m being equal to a signature Si. It is necessary to note that it is impossible to
compute P (Si = m), because of the human factor involved. For example, the users
may arbitrarily decided to tweak OS settings. For an Internet-wide scan, apriori
probability for a class can be computed iteratively but we leave it for future work.
As mentioned earlier many efforts have been made to solve the above problem
using the TCP/IP stack, but few efforts have been made to reduce the number of
probes sent to the target machine [7, 9, 6, 5], and to the best of our knowledge, no
work has been done to robustly fingerprint a large number of machines. If we wish
to accurately fingerprint all of the publicly addressable machines on the internet, we
need to make sure that our approach is not only resilient to noise an packet loss, but
is also polite. Now [5] and [6], which use RTO values for identification, are polite,
but fail to address noise and packet loss. In the following subsections we address
the problem of noise and packet loss associated with RTO by carrying out a rigorous
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analysis of the two problems.
B. Noise
The first issue we consider is that of noise on the Internet. In the ideal conditions
assuming the delay between the sender and the receiver is d, and the retransmission
timeout values at the sender and receiver are R and Z, respectively, the values of
Z and R would be same. But, as shown in [25], normally there is jitter(δ) in the
Internet packet delay, which is illustrated in Fig. 3. Therefore, due to the presence
of jitter, the values Zi and Ri are not the same and we have
Zi = Ri + (δi+1 − δi) (3.4)
Thus it is required that the classification algorithm we use effectively deal with jitter,
which we refer to as noise from now on.
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C. Packet Loss
Next we consider the issue of packet loss, which can reach as high as 3.8% for SYN-
ACK packets[10]. In ideal circumstances when there is no packet loss the RTO values
measured at the receiver are approximately equal to the RTO values of the sender,
but in the case of packet loss we have a different scenario. Therefore, considering
Q as a vector representing the values measured at the receiver,and N as a vector
indicating the packets which are actually received by the receiver we have
Qj =
Nj+1−1∑
i=Nj
Zi (3.5)
where n is the number of packets received.
The above equation shows not only the length of the RTO vector gets reduced,
but also the observed RTO value changes. As an example, for FreeBSD 7.x the RTO
vector without any packet loss is {3, 6, 12}. However, should the third packet be
lost, then the RTO vector in that case would be {3, 18}. Therefore, the classification
scheme we use, should deal with the above issue effectively.
D. Snacktime
Here we explore the need for augmenting feature vector, by showing that features
currently used by Snacktime are not enough in accurately identifying an Operating
System. We motivate this by showing how Snacktime fails to address the issues
discussed is the previous section. Therefore, let Sij be the j-th feature of the i-th
class of operating system, such that i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , ki, where ki
is the number of features of the i-th class. Given, the above information, Snacktime
only considers the operating systems which have the same number of features in
the signature i.e. the value of k are same. Snacktime, uses the following formula
13
when using receiver window size and TTL, to determine the score corresponding to
a particular class, and the class with maximum score is declared to be the predicted
class.
Yi = max(|Xj − Sij|, 10−6)
Ui =
n∑
j=1
d− log10 Yie+Wi + Ti (3.6)
where Wi and Ti are the weights associated with receiver window size and TTL. If
the receiver window size of the fingerprint and the signature match, Wi is assigned a
value of 3, other a value of zero is assigned. Ti, is a assigned a value of 2, if the TTL
of fingerprint is .less than the TTL of the signature and is within 32 seconds, a value
of 1 is assigned if TTL of fingerprint is only less than TTL of signature. In all other
cases a value of 0 is assigned to Ti.
Now, if we consider the fingerprint and signatures in Table I, and assume that the
TTL andWin values are equivalent, the total score for Signature 1 is 11, while that of
Signature 2 is 6. Thus the fingerprint is determined to belong to OS being represented
by class 1, when in fact it should have been assigned to Signature 2, which may be
deviating from the fingerprint due to the presence of noise. This behavior of Snacktime
can be attributed to the fact that the RTO values are compared individually, when,
in fact, the whole vector should have been compared at once. In response to this
problem, we first augment the feature vector and then present an approach in Part
V, that effectively deals with noise and packet loss. Secondly, the weights assigned for
the receiver window size and TTL are totally arbitrary without and rigorous analysis.
Finally, discrete and random features are used together in the classification algorithm,
when in fact they should be treated differently.
14
Table I. Sample Snacktime Fingerprint and Signatures
Type RTO1 RTO2
Fingerprint 3.000000 24.000000
Signature 1 3.000000 12.000020
Signature 2 3.299999 25.500879
15
CHAPTER IV
SNAP
In this section, we first show the feature vector for the proposed solution. We follow
it, by talking about our signature database, and how the signature are preprocessed
before being used in the classification algorithm. We end this section by introducing
the proposed solution.
A. Feature Vector
An important aspect of operating system fingerprinting is that a signature represent-
ing an operating system should clearly differentiate it from other OSes. Hence, in
this sub-section we consider the features that aid us in achieving the above goal. The
features that we use are shown in Table II.
We use eight additional features as compared to Snacktime, which only usesWin,
TTL and SA-RTO. In addition to considering RTO values between the SYN-ACK
packets we consider the RTO value between the last SYN-ACK packet and RST/RST-
ACK packet R-RTO, as shown in Fig. 1, which helps us in resolving ambiguities. For
example, by considering the R-RTO in Table III we can resolve the ambiguity between
Mac OS 10.1.x and NetBSD 4.0.1 shown in Table III, which would otherwise have
similar SA-RTO patterns. Moreover by default, we consider RTO values greater than
65 seconds, which again helps us in better differentiating OSes. For instance without
considering the last SA-RTO of Linux 2.0.X (Table III), the SA-RTO vector of both
Linux 2.0.x and Linux 2.6.x would have similar SA-RTO vectors.
Additionally, we have found a large variety of behavior pertaining to the RST/RST-
ACK packets. Because, the behavior is not well defined in the RFC, the properties of
there RST/RST-ACK response, or lack of a response are very OS dependent. Thus,
16
Table II. Signature Description
Feature Description Type
Win Default Receiver Window Size M
TTL Initial Time to live M
SA-RTO RTO values between SYN-ACK packets MNL
R-RTO RTO value between the last SYN-ACK packet and
RST/RST-ACK packet
MNL
DF DF bit set or not M
OPT TCP options and their sequence F
RST RST packet sent by the target F
RA RST-ACK packet sent by the target F
R-Broken Non-zero ACK value in RST Packet F
R-Win Receiver window size in RST/RST-ACK is zeroed F
R-Seq Sequence number incremented in the RST/RST-ACK
packet
F
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five of our features are based on RST/RST-ACK packet. Then, depending on whether
a RST or RST/ACK is sent by the target, we set the appropriate value to 1. We then
consider the various peculiarities of RST/RST-ACK packets to extract the features
R-Win, R-Seq, and R-Broken, which are explained in Table II.
Support for various TCP options differs between operating systems, and is OS
dependent, as RFC 1232 is not specific about various implementation details. As a
result, some operating systems support all of the standard TCP options (MSS, Win-
dow Scaling, SACK Permitted, SACK, NOP, and EOL), while others only support a
subset of them. Moreover, the ordering of options in the TCP header of SYN-ACK
packets varies among operating systems. So, similar to most other fingerprinting tools
we also make use of TCP options (Opt) as one of the features of our signature.
The last feature we consider DF pertains to the Don’t Fragment bit in the IP
header. Some operating systems set this bit by default, while others clear this bit, so
we identify this behavior and accordingly set the value of DF to 1 or 0. Most of the
features discussed above have been used in other tools, with the exceptions of R-Win
and R-Seq, which to the best of our knowledge haven’t been used before.
It is important to understand that different features in the signature have dif-
ferent properties. Certain features like Win, DF, and TTL can be changed easily by
either altering registry values or by editing specific configuration files, while features
like Opt and those related to RST/RST-ACK packets are hard to change without
hacking the kernel. Hence, based on the above nature of the features, features can
be either Modifiable represented by M or Fixed represented by F. The remaining
random features, SA-RTO and R-RTO, are not only random but are altered in noisy
and lossy condition. Therefore, we identify the lossy nature of this features using L,
random nature using R and noisy nature using N. Finally, note that, for embedded
devices, unless they are behind normalizers [26] or scrubbers [27], it is difficult to
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change any of the above mentioned features.
B. Signature Database
We now discuss our signature database, which currently contains 115 signatures.
We prepared these signatures by either installing the operating system, or by using
already-installed systems. Using our signature we can not only distinguish different
operating systems like Windows, Linux etc, but we can also identify different ver-
sions of Windows, Linux, FreeBSD etc. We collected 50 samples for each operating
system, so that we could use them as training data in our classification algorithm.
These samples were collected over a period of 24 hours to account for different load
conditions.
While preparing our signature database, we noticed that, in general, the first
RTO value had much larger variations as compared to other RTO values. This could
explained by noting that the first RTO timer might be starting between two clock
ticks, hence resulting on an average error of half the clock tick period [28]. Also, we
noticed that Windows Server 2003 was the only OS which seemed to have multiple
RTO patterns. The first RTO ranges from anywhere between 2.5 and 4.5 seconds,
while the second RTO was between 5.8 and 9.5 seconds.
C. Signature Preprocessing
In this section we provide details about the preprocessing we do with the signatures
to make Snap robust against noise and packet loss.
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1. Clustering
As a first step we group signatures together into different Clusters. This clustering is
done based on the length of the signatures, type of the packet sent and overlapping
of RTO values. As, an example all the operating systems which have a signature of
length 4, which send only SYN-ACK packets and have overlapping RTO values are
grouped together into one cluster. By overlapping RTO values we mean that the
interval formed by the min and max value of the j-th RTO of Si and by considering
a threshold of 0.1 sec, should overlap with the corresponding interval for Sk. If all
the RTO’s of two signatures overlap and they satisfy the other two criteria of same
length and type of packets, then they are grouped together. Now, in order for a new
signature to be a part of this cluster, it should satisfy the above three requirements
with all the signatures already present in the cluster. By applying clustering on our
signature database, we end up with 58 cluster, and the average size of a cluster being
2.
Now, the main motivation behind clustering is to eliminate the affect of noise.
By using clustering, instead of find an exact match for an unknown sample, we look
for a cluster with similar RTO vector, thereby ignoring the noise that may have been
introduced as a result of delay jitter. After finding the appropriate cluster we use
other features like TCP options, receiver window size, TTL and DF to select an
operating system which best matches the given unknown sample.
2. Cumulative RTO Values
We make use of cumulative RTO values in conjugation with binary search to deal
with the packet loss. For cumulative RTO values, instead of considering the time
difference between two SYN-ACK packets, we consider the time difference relative to
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the first packet. The i-th Ccumulative RTO (Ci) is given using the following equation
Ci =
i−1∑
j=0
Zj. (4.1)
As we saw earlier, in case of packet loss the measured RTO values Zi are dras-
tically affected and also the number of RTO values are reduced. In the case of Ci
only the number of RTO values get affected but the values remain the same, as the
Ci values are measured relative to the first received packet. The only exception to
this is when the first SYN-ACK packet gets lost, in which case all the Ci values get
affected.
Let Cj represent the j-th cumulative RTO value of the fingerprint, and let C
′
ij
represent the j-th RTO value of the i-th signature. Now, to detect packet loss when
considering a signature Si, we do binary search for each of the Cj value on C
′
i. Now, if
Z and Si are of the same length, we skip the binary search and assign a correspondence
between them such that Zj corresponds to the Sij. If the signature is longer than
fingerprint, then some of the values in the signature have no correspondence in the
fingerprint and this help us in detecting the packet loss.
For e.g., the RTO vector for FreeBSD is {3, 6, 12}, which when represented in
cumulative RTO form would be {3, 9, 21} If the third packet is lost, the original
RTO vector for the fingerprint would be {3, 18}, while the same in cumulative format
would be {3, 21}. Now, on doing a binary search for 3 on the FreeBSD signature
vector would result in it corresponding with the first RTO of the signature, while
doing it for 21 would result it in corresponding to the third RTO of FreeBSD vector.
Thus, the second RTO of the FreeBSD vector is unassigned thereby indicating the
third packet was not received at the receiver end.
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D. Classification Algorithm
In this subsection we discuss the algorithm used in Snap to detect the operating
system of the target machine. As shown in Fig. 4, we begin by grouping the signatures
into different clusters. This is followed by filtering the signatures based on reset
parameters. If the RST or RST-ACK packets are not observed in the fingerprint,
we skip this filtering process, as they might have been lost during transit. We do
this filtering because the reset properties are highly implementation specific as RFC’s
make no mention about their implementation details. Next, we determine the best
cluster corresponding the signature. We follow this by filtering based on the TCP
options. Now, if no signature in the cluster has matching TCP options, we return
with a no match. But, if there are signatures with the same ordering and support for
TCP option, we determine which signature in the cluster has the most similar Win,
DF and TTL values. If there is more than one signature having the maximum match
forWin, DF and TTL values then we call it as a tie and return the cluster, otherwise
the OS corresponding to the signature with the highest match forWin, DF and TTL
values is returned as the predicted OS. Now the most important part of the algorithm
discussed above is the identification of the correct cluster. The algorithm we use for
this purpose is shown in Algorithm 1. Here we consider only those signatures which
have a length greater than equal to the length of the fingerprint. Next, we perform
binary search for all the remaining signatures. During binary search if more than one
Cj value corresponds to any C
′
ij value, we discard that signature. For each of the
remaining signature we calculate the probability of it matching the fingerprint using
a modified K-NN algorithm, which is explained next. Finally, we return the cluster
corresponding to the signature with the highest probability.
In the modified K-NN algorithm, to compute the probability for each candidate
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Algorithm 1 Snap RTO Matching Algorithm
ci = 1 for all signatures {Candidates}
for all Si where LenZ >= LenSi do
for all Cj do
k = binarysearch(Cj, C
′
i) {Returns corresponding signature RTO, -1 returned
if the determined RTO is already assigned}
if k = −1 then
ci = 0
break
else
posij = k {Store corresponding Signature RTO position}
end if
end for
end for
P = modified k-NN (Z, Si, c, pos)
Pi = Pi × 0.038(LenZ−LenSi ) for all signatures
return maxP
signature i, we consider all the samples of a signature. Using the following equations
we compute the probability for the fingerprint being generated by a particular oper-
ating system under the assumption of delay jitter having laplace distribution with a
mean of 0.1 seconds.
Pi = P (Si + δ = Z) =
50∑
j=1
P (|δ| = |Si − Z|)
P (|δ| = |Si − Z|) =
nk∏
k=1
P (δik = Sik − Zk) (4.2)
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CHAPTER V
EVALUATION
We evaluate Snap against Snacktime under four different conditions by using 10-fold
cross-validation. In order to carry out 10-fold cross-validation, during each iteration
we divide the data into two parts, test and training. The training data is used to
train the classifier, while the test data is used to check the accuracy of the trained
model. This process is repeated 10 times, each time selecting different data as test
and training data.
In order to simulate the lossy and noisy nature of traffic on the Internet, we
carry out Cross-validation under four different conditions. In the first case we assume
that there is no noise and packet loss, while in the second case we assume noise
affecting the RTO values. We assume that the jitter values are distributed as per
Laplace distribution with a mean of 0.1 secs. The generated delay is then added or
subtracted from the RTO values to simulate noise. As show earlier, packet loss on
the internet is to the extent of 3.8% for SYN-ACK packets. In the third case, we
randomly drop 3.8% of the packets we are considering to simulate packet loss. It is
interesting to note that though the packet loss is to the extent of 3.8% the number
of samples affected by packet loss are much larger. Finally, in the fourth case we
introduce both noise and packet loss using the above mentioned models. Here, it is
important to note that in all the cases noise and packet loss is only applied to the
test data, while for training purposed we consider no noise and packet loss.
Table IV shows accuracy of Snap and Snacktime when considering the complete
algorithm. As the table shows Snap performs significantly better than Snacktime
under all conditions. Since Snacktime only considers signatures of same length as
candidates, in presence of packet loss the accuracy falls by nearly 12%, when compared
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Table IV. 10-fold Cross-validation Accuracy
Conditon Snap Accuracy Snacktime Accuracy
Normal 99.92% 84.62%
Noise 98.39% 81.43%
Packet Loss 98.86% 74.35%
Noise + Packet Loss 96.32% 72.45%
to normal conditions. This conforms to the above result which shows that a large
number of samples are affected by just 3.8% loss of SYN-ACK packets.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERNET SCAN
A. Scan Statistics
In order to determine the distribution of different operating systems on the Internet,
we scan for all the publicly accessible machines running a web server on the Internet,
using a custom scanner. We conducted the scan from a Windows Server 2008 machine
with 16GB of RAM and 2 Dual core 1.70 GHz AMD Opteron processors. The SYN
probe that was sent to each machine reassembles the SYN packet sent by a Windows
Server 2008 machine with ECN and TCP timestamp option enabled. While, finger-
printing live hosts running a web server, we also did banner grabbing, so as to use
the information for verification purposes.
As you can see in Table V nearly 37.8 million machines replied to our SYN probes.
Of this majority of them supported MSS option, while nearly 2.32% machines support
ECN. As Table VI shows nearly 75% of the hosts that responded to out SYN probe
also replied to our GET request. The average size of the downloaded page that we
could parse was 3.351 KB. This is due to the fact that nearly 10 million hosts replied
with 4xx messages, which typically are smaller compared to other responses, as they
only contain the error code and their description.
B. Results
In this subsection we analyze of the results of SYN scan used for OS detection. Of
the nearly 37.8 million machines on the internet, we were able to uniquely identify
66.25% of these machines. By unique identification we mean that we were able to
narrow down the OS running on that machine to one unique OS. As Table VII shows
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Table V. SYN-ACK Scan Statistics
Property # of hosts
Live Hosts 37,808,896
ECN Support 878,579 (2.32%)
MSS 37,610,829
Window Scaling 31,412,934
Timestamps 28,270,643
SACK Permitted 23,041,898
End Of Options List 2,349,369
Table VI. HTTP Scan Statistics
Property # of hosts
Responses 28,592,538
Connection reset by peer 3,294,344
No data 2,942,658
Select Timeout 2,734,952
Connection timed out 371,262
Connection Refused 30,770
Software caused connection abort 1,341
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Table VII. Top 5 Operating Systems
Operating System # of hosts
Linux 2.6.x/2.4.x 7,315,946
VxWorks A 3,698,707
VxWorks B 2,044,608
Windows Server 2003 SP1 SP2 1,657,696
Windows XP 2002 SP3/Microsoft Server 2003 1,565,008
Linux 2.4.x/2.6.x is the most popular OS, with nearly 1/4th of the uniquely identified
machines running it. The next most popular operating system is VxWorks, an embed-
ded Real-time Operating System, used extensively in routers, modems, and printers
etc. Here the second and the third most popular OS correspond to two different
signatures for VxWorks. Ideally the port 80 should be blocked on these devices, but
as the results show, it is not done, thus showing how insecure devices on the Internet
are. At the fourth and fifth spot we have two different versions of Windows, It is
interesting to see Windows XP at the 5th spot, but as TCP/IP stack of XP/2000 and
2003 are nearly the same, in many cases it is difficult to differentiae Windows Server
2003 from XP and 2000.
As shown earlier, we try to predict the cluster the machine may belong to, if we
are not able to find an unique match for the machine. We end up identifying clusters
for 10.35% of the machines (Table VIII), we found on the Internet. Linux again
occupies the top spot for having the maximum number of hosts in a cluster. We have
4 different signatures for Linux, and these signatures are distinguished from each other
by use of different receiver window size values. So, if we get a new receiver window
size value with all the other features same, we end up assigning the machine to the
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Table VIII. Top 5 Clusters
Cluster # of hosts
Linux 2,601,436
ADSL Routers Cluster 419,952
Windows A 264,133
FreeBSD+VxWorks 237,680
Windows B 149,539
cluster. Hence, such a large number of values in the Linux cluster show that in many
instance receiver window size values are changed by the user. Besides VxWorks being
used extensively for routers and modems, we also found a large number of routers
and modems running a particular OS which we could not identify, hence we label it
as ADSL router, which is at the second position among the top 5 clusters. This is
followed by a cluster of windows, composed of different versions of XP/2000/2003 in
the third and fifth position. Finally, as the signature of a version of FreeBSD and one
of the signatures of VxWorks i differ only in receiver window size, they are clustered
together and they occupy the fourth position
Finally, in Table IX we show the number of hosts running various popular op-
erating systems. It is interesting to see embedded systems occupying the top spot,
thus indicating a large number of routers and modems run web servers. As expected
embedded systems are followed by Linux, which is followed by Windows, FreeBSD
and Mac. It should be noted that, the numbers presented in IX correspond to only
uniquely identified OS.
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Table IX. Common Operating Systems
Operating System # of Hosts
Embedded 9,661,843
Linux 8,900,335
Windows 5,218,990
BSD 826,812
MacOS 80,918
C. Verification
Using the http-scan we did along with fingerprinting scan, we carry out basic veri-
fication. In order to verify the operating system of the machine we either used the
HTTP server response header or the web-page itself. Also we manually looked at
the fingerprint to identify the OS running on the target machine. The results of our
verification are shown in Table X. Based on the above methodology and information,
these results only give a basic idea about the accuracy of our scan and the results
may vary as per the interpretation. In future we plan to carry out a much thorough
verification and also compare our results with Nmap. As the results in Table X show,
we had nearly perfect accuracy in almost all the cases except for the 5th OS, which
had a lower accuracy because of a previously unknown OS is assigned to that class.
If we include the signature for that unknown OS in our signature database, we again
get 100% accuracy.
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Table X. Basic Verification
OS Correct Incorrect New signaturs
Linux 2.6.x/2.4.x 49 1 0
VxWorks A 50 0 0
VxWorks B 50 0 0
Windows Server 2003 SP1 SP2 50 0 0
Windows XP 2002 SP3/Microsoft Server 2003 45 0 5
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CHAPTER VII
DEFENSES
Operating system fingerprinting poses a security threat, because once the operating
system of a machine is known, one can tailor the attack based on it. Hence, in order
to deal with this threat effectively it is required that we obfuscate the machine’s
operating system. One simple way to defeat IRLSnack is to randomize the number of
retransmission tries [6] and also randomize the initial retransmission timeout value.
Randomizing the initial timeout would suffice because in most cases, as successive
timeout values in most as are computed using initial timeout values. To further add
a layer of obfuscation one can make changes to the values of TCP/IP header fields,
so as to resemble that of some other operating systems. The defenses suggested till
now require that changes be made to each individual host, a network administrator
can avoid doing that by ensuring that for all outgoing packets, the TCP/IP header
values are similar to an arbitrary OS, and also by ensuring that for all machines in the
network the number and value of RTO is again same as some random OS, preferably
not present on the network.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
In this paper we developed robust techniques so as to fingerprint all the publicly
available machines on the internet. We were successful in identifying nearly 78%
percent of the machines we discovered during our scan. In future to further increase
the detection, we plan to start an open source project so as to increase the number
of signature in the signature database. Also, we intend to do scans on different ports
thereby obtaining a much larger picture of OS distribution on the internet.
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